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Abstract
Worldwide, policymakers and purchasers are exploring innovative provider payment strategies
promoting value in health care, known as value-based payments (VBP). What is meant by ‘value’,
however, is often unclear and the relationship between value and the payment design is not explicated.
This paper aims at: (1) identifying value dimensions that are ideally stimulated by VBP and (2)
constructing a framework of a theoretically preferred VBP design. Based on a synthesis of both theoretical
and empirical studies on payment incentives, we conclude that VBP should consist of two components: a
relatively large base payment that implicitly stimulates value and a relatively small payment that explicitly
rewards measurable aspects of value (pay-for-performance). Being the largest component, the base
payment design is essential, but often neglected when it comes to VBP reform. We explain that this base
payment ideally (1) is paid to a multidisciplinary provider group (2) for a cohesive set of care activities for
a predefined population, (3) is fixed, (4) is adjusted for the population’s risk profile and (5) includes risk-
mitigating measures. Finally, some important trade-offs in the practical operationalisation of VBP are
discussed.
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1. Introduction
Worldwide, there is dissatisfaction with current, input-oriented and supply-led health care
systems. These systems are characterised by monodisciplinary and segmented care and result in
fragmented care processes, suboptimal quality and waste of resources (Porter & Teisberg, 2006;
Berwick, 2011; De Bakker et al., 2012; Mechanic & Tompkins, 2012; Pronovost, 2013; Tsia-
christas, 2015). There is consensus that flawed provider payment methods contribute to this
problem (McGuire, 2000; Porter & Teisberg, 2006; McGuire, 2011). In particular, predominant
payment methods generate perverse incentives for health care providers regarding the delivery of
services. For example, fee-for-service (FFS) – in which providers are paid retrospectively for each
service delivered – is still a very common payment method in health care (especially in the
United States) because it is relatively easy to administer and encourages productivity (Jegers
et al., 2002; Marmor et al., 2011). However, this payment method may generate a ‘more-is-better
culture’ and therefore tends to overprovision. In addition, providers who promote population
health and successfully prevent treatment are financially penalised for that (Jegers et al., 2002;
Ellis & Miller, 2008). Another widespread payment method (especially in Europe) is capitation,
in which providers receive a fixed amount per person per period. This payment method also has
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important drawbacks, such as encouraging underprovision and risk selection (Porter & Kaplan,
2016). Furthermore, both FFS and capitation (as well as other predominant payment methods)
do not reward the provision of high-quality care and innovation. Finally, because these methods
traditionally remunerate single, monodisciplinary providers instead of multidisciplinary groups
of providers, they preserve fragmentation and thwart cooperation and coordination across the
continuum of care (Epping-Jordan et al., 2004; Van Exel et al., 2005). In short, predominant
payment methods are not fully aligned with ‘value’.
In order to tackle the problems related to current payment methods, worldwide, policymakers
and purchasers of care are exploring alternative payment strategies to help steering health care
systems towards value (Conrad et al., 2014; Burwell, 2015). A well-known endeavour in this
regard is pay-for-performance (P4P), in which providers are explicitly rewarded for ‘doing a
better job’. Although P4P is an appealing idea, explicit financial incentives for value should in
principle be used only modestly in provider payment methods because of the multitasking
problem (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; see section 3.2).
Therefore, it is not surprising that in practice, the majority of provider revenues (typically
referred to as the base payment) is not explicitly linked to value. This base payment, however, does
create implicit (dis)incentives for value, because each payment method influences providers’ beha-
viour through incentives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Enthoven, 1988; Prendergast, 1999; McGuire,
2000; Gaynor et al., 2004; Berenson, 2010; Christianson & Conrad, 2011; McGuire, 2011). In this
paper, we underline the importance of carefully considering the design of particularly these implicit
financial incentives, in such a manner that desired behaviour is fostered and value is incentivised.
We discuss a theoretically preferred design of a payment method that both implicitly and explicitly
stimulates value in a broad sense, henceforth referred to as value-based payment (VBP).
There is substantial literature on the theory and implementation of payment incentives (for an
overview, see McGuire, 2000; McGuire, 2011; Conrad et al., 2014; Conrad, 2015; Conrad et al.,
2016). However, the theoretical basis of VBP design is fragmented and in the available work, the
terms ‘value’ and ‘VBP’ are often implicitly used for different dimensions of value. In addition, the
relationship between what a health care system ideally pursues in terms of value and what is
required in terms of the VBP design to achieve this has not been explicated. Therefore, this paper
aims at: (1) identifying key-value dimensions that are ideally stimulated by VBP and (2) con-
structing a conceptual framework of a theoretically preferred VBP design according to these
dimensions. We achieve these goals based on a synthesis of findings of key theoretical and
empirical studies conducted in the field of health services research, health economics, contract
theory and the general economic theory on incentive design. Throughout, we relate our findings to
VBP initiatives from practice, and end with illustrating some important trade-offs in the practical
operationalisation of VBP. The insights from this paper are of practical relevance for policymakers
and purchasers who are responsible for (re)designing existing and future VBP initiatives.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, key-value dimensions are
discussed, followed by a section containing a concise theoretical background on payment
methods. The fourth section focusses on a theoretically preferred VBP design. Section 5 illus-
trates several important trade-offs in the practical operationalisation of VBP, followed by some
concluding remarks.
2. Key-value dimensions in health care
In previous work, the term ‘value’ in health care has been defined in different ways. According to
the Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2001), health care needs to be safe, effective, patient-centred,
timely, efficient and equitable. Berwick et al. (2008) state that a health care system should pursue
a Triple Aim of limiting per capita cost of care, improving individual patient experience and
improving population health. Porter (2009, 2010) provides a more global description of health
care system goals, namely maximal value, defined as the best health outcomes achieved per dollar
2 Daniëlle Cattel et al.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744133118000397
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Erasmus MC Rotterdam, on 07 Nov 2018 at 14:16:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
spent. Value encompasses efficiency and the central focus is on multidimensional outcomes,
rather than inputs and processes. Conrad (2015) defines value as maximum health benefit (i.e.
health outcomes, processes of care and patient experience) at minimum cost.
Based on these descriptions as well as arguments derived from the societal debate on what
stakeholders in health care should ideally aim for (Eijkenaar & Schut, 2015), five key-value
dimensions can be distinguished:
1. High-quality care. Care is safe, effective, patient-centred and timely. High quality
comprises ‘technical’ or clinical quality as well as patient-reported measures regarding
individual care paths and outcomes (e.g. PROMs). Technical quality can be operationalised
in structures (e.g. having an up-to-date patient registry for diabetes patients affiliated with
the primary care practice), processes (e.g. regularly checking the blood glucose levels of
diabetes patients) and (intermediate) outcomes (e.g. acceptable blood sugar levels for
diabetes patients or absence of diabetes-related complications) (Donabedian, 1988).
2. Cost-conscious behaviour. Scarce resources are efficiently used, so there is no misuse or
overuse.
3. Well-coordinated care. Multidisciplinary providers communicate and cooperate well in
order to realise integrated, well-orchestrated care across the continuum of care. This
dimension mainly regards coordination between providers of different disciplines and sites.
A team-based approach in which multidisciplinary providers work side-by-side is of great
importance, particularly given the increase in the number of individuals with multiple
(chronic) diseases.
4. Cost-effective innovation. Cost-saving services result in equal or better health and health-
promoting innovations are worth the additional costs.
5. Cost-effective prevention. Deteriorations of health problems are prevented in a cost-
effective way. This dimension entails primary, secondary and tertiary prevention.
In this paper, a payment method is considered ‘value-based’ if it simultaneously provides
incentives for all dimensions. Clearly, these dimensions are interrelated. For instance, well-
coordinated care can be considered an element of high-quality care. However, for the purpose of
describing a theoretically preferred VBP design, it is necessary to explicitly distinguish the
different dimensions of value. Note, however, that it is not the goal of this paper to develop
indicators for measuring value. As we will argue below (Section 3.2), the measurement of all
aspects of value and calculating payments only based on indicator scores is neither feasible nor
desirable.
3. Theoretical background on provider payment methods
3.1 Financial incentives to counterbalance agency problems
Agency theory, as part of contract theory, studies the relation between two contracting parties:
the principal and the agent (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). In this paper, the focus is
on the health care provider acting as a double agent, interacting with both the patient and the
purchaser (Blomqvist, 1991). Information asymmetry between providers as the relatively well-
informed party relative to patients and purchasers is not a problem, as long as the interests of all
involved parties are aligned (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). However, in case of conflicting
interests, agency problems may evolve and providers may exploit their information surplus for
their own (financial) benefit (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Richardson, 1981).
An important strategy to counterbalance agency problems entails ‘controlling’ the agent by
means of (financial) incentives (Vermaas, 2006). The goal of controlling is to align providers’
interests with those of patients’ and ‘purchasers’ and is based on the assumption that providers
are in the position to improve value if they are motivated to do so. Providers’ responsiveness to
Health Economics, Policy and Law 3
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744133118000397
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Erasmus MC Rotterdam, on 07 Nov 2018 at 14:16:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
financial incentives has been well documented in the literature, implying that the (design of the)
payment method is an important factor influencing providers’ behaviour and can thus be used to
help steering health care systems towards value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Enthoven, 1988;
Prendergast, 1999; McGuire, 2000; Gaynor et al., 2004; Berenson, 2010; McGuire, 2011).
3.2 The need for a base payment
Ideally, providers who are ‘doing a good job’ in terms of key-value dimensions are explicitly
rewarded for this. A prerequisite of a payment method based fully on providers’ performance
with respect to value is that all aspects of value can be captured in the payment contract (i.e. for
each aspect an indicator is available on which providers can be ‘scored’). Complete contracts are,
however, unfeasible in health care since the outcomes of some of the multiple tasks that providers
perform, are more difficult (or even impossible) to measure objectively than others. For instance,
for some medical interventions reliable and valid outcome indicators are available, whereas for
other care activities – e.g. good communication and coordination of care – the added value is
difficult to measure and appropriate registries are lacking. This problem has been referred to as
the multitasking problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Eggleston, 2005; Frølich et al., 2007)
and is defined as the challenge of designing incentives to motivate appropriate effort across
multiple tasks when the desired outcomes for some tasks are more difficult to measure than
others (Eggleston, 2005). An important potential consequence of this challenge is that explicitly
rewarding providers for some specific aspects of value may result in undesired behaviour. Spe-
cifically, providers may focus disproportionately on those tasks that are measured and rewarded
and neglect unincentivised tasks. This phenomenon has been referred to as ‘teaching to the test’
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) and has actually been observed in practice (Steel et al., 2007;
Glickman et al., 2007; Campbell et al., 2009; Mullen et al., 2010).
Due to the multitasking problem and the associated risk of teaching to the test, explicit
financial incentives for value can and should be used only modestly in provider payment
methods. As a consequence, the majority of providers’ revenues can and should not be explicitly
related to value. This part of providers’ revenue is commonly referred to as the base payment.
This base payment will typically comprise the largest part of total provider payment, whereas the
payment component explicitly related to performance indicators (P4P) is likely to be relatively
small. Indeed in practice, base payments currently comprise at least 90% of total provider
payment (Eijkenaar, 2013; Ryan et al., 2015; Milstein & Schreyögg, 2016). So far, papers
investigating VBP reform have focussed mainly on the design of the relatively small P4P com-
ponent. Being the largest payment component, however, the design of the base payment is at
least equally and arguably more important.
3.3 Shortcomings of predominant and alternative base payment methods
The four most frequently applied base payment methods in practice are payment per item-of-
service (FFS), payment per case (e.g. DRG’s), payment per person (capitation) and payment per
period (salary for individual providers and fixed budget for organisations). In Table 1, the
incentives generated by these methods in relation to the key-value dimensions are summarised,
based on Jegers et al. (2002), Ellis & Miller (2008) and Christianson & Conrad (2011). This table
shows that, although each payment method to some extent stimulates at least one key-value
dimension, other dimensions are not incentivised or even discouraged.
As none of the predominant base payment methods adequately promotes all key-value
dimensions, alternative base payment methods have been developed. One example is combining
predominant methods with opposing incentives in order to sustain the favourable elements of
each method, while neutralising the drawbacks (Ellis & McGuire, 1986; Robinson, 2001;
Christianson & Conrad, 2011; McGuire, 2011). Unfortunately, it is still unlikely that all value
dimensions are stimulated under these mixtures (see Table 1, for a mixed payment method of
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50% FFS and 50% capitation). Another recent example of an alternative base payment method is
bundled or episode-based payment (De Brantes et al., 2009; Mechanic & Altman, 2009; De
Bakker et al., 2012; Ridgely et al., 2014). Although bundling stimulates cost-conscious behaviour
and well-coordinated care, value is only stimulated to some extent and only for those services
inside the bundle (Wilensky, 2014; Table 1).
4 A theoretically preferred VBP design
4.1 Core components of a theoretically preferred VBP
Building on the theory as discussed in Section 3, a theoretically preferred VBP should consist of
two core components: (1) a substantial base payment that implicitly stimulates key-value
dimensions and (2) a relatively small variable payment that explicitly rewards some measurable
aspects of value dimensions (P4P). A base payment is a vital component of a theoretically
preferred VBP because of the multitasking problem and the risk of teaching to the test when
using high-powered explicit incentives (Section 3.2). Nevertheless, relatively small explicit
rewards are a crucial component of a theoretically preferred VBP. This payment component is
required to ensure that value aspects that are not or cannot be implicitly incentivised by the base
payment, are given sufficient attention by providers. The variable payment is particularly suitable
for stimulating aspects of value that can be relatively easily and objectively measured and that are
difficult to incentivise implicitly (Vlaanderen et al., 2018). Typically, these aspects are related to
the value dimension ‘high-quality care’ since a broad spectrum of indicators has already been
developed and is increasingly becoming available as a result of an increasing number of P4P-
experiments and initiatives employed by the International Consortium for Health Outcomes
Measurement (ICHOM). Other measurable aspects of other value dimensions, however, can be
part of the variable payment as well (e.g. smoking cessation counselling as an element of cost-
effective prevention; Lindenauer et al., 2007; Mendelson et al., 2017).
The two components should be well tailored to ensure every value dimensions is implicitly
and/or explicitly incentivised by VBP. The variable payment can be either designed as an ‘add-
on’ to the base payment or as an integral part. The first modality is similar to most current P4P-
programs, while in the latter modality receiving (part of) the base payment is conditional on
meeting specific value targets. Note that the relative shares of the two components may vary over
time and may depend heavily on the specific context (see Section 5). For instance, if better
Table 1. Base payment methods and their incentives for key-value dimensionsa
High-
quality
care
Cost-
conscious
behaviour
Well-
coordinated
careb
Cost-
effective
innovation
Cost-
effective
prevention
Payment per item-of-service ± − − − −
Payment per case ± ± − ± −
Payment per person − + − − +
Payment per period − ± − − ±
Mixed payment method of 50%
FFS and 50% capitation
± + − b − ±
Bundled or episode-based
payment
± ± ± ± −
FFS= fee-for-service.
aAuthors’ own analysis.
bBy definition, no incentives for well-coordinated care exist because in these examples the payment is assumed to apply to a single,
monodisciplinary provider.
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performance indicators become available, the share of the variable component that explicitly
rewards high quality may increase relative to the base component.
In practice, there are several payment methods that come close to the theoretically preferred
VBP design as described above. Box 1 provides a description of three prominent examples. In the
remainder of this paper, we relate our findings to these examples.
Box 1. VBP practice initiatives.
Medicare accountable care organisations (ACOs)
ACOs are networks of health care providers that are jointly accountable for a share of the financial and
clinical outcomes of a defined population during a predetermined period. Examples of public sector ACO
models are the Medicare Pioneer ACO model and the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Under
the MSSP, a global budget based on the historical expenses of an assigned population of Medicare FFS
beneficiaries is calculated. This ‘benchmark’ is corrected for national growth and is adjusted for
population risk. Shared savings (and losses) are determined by comparing the benchmark to the ACO’s
actual expenditures and are conditional on meeting a minimum savings rate and quality standard.
Assignment of the population to ACOs is mainly done retrospectively (Pham et al., 2010; Lewis et al., 2013;
Song, 2014; McWilliams et al., 2015; Rose et al., 2016).
The alternative quality contract (AQC)
The AQC is a 5-year ACO agreement in the private sector introduced by Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Massachusetts (BCBS). Under the AQC, an annual fixed payment is provided, based on a per member per
month amount. Providers are responsible for the total continuum of care for a defined population of
enrolees, that is prospectively attributed to a provider group by means of the affiliation of their designated
primary care physician. The base payment is set using historical expenses and is adjusted periodically for
(changes in) health risk. The base payment and future increases thereof (i.e. annual growth rates) are
negotiated between provider groups and BCBS. Providers share both financial savings and losses. In
addition to the global budget, providers who meet quality benchmarks are explicitly rewarded via the
P4P-program (a bonus of maximal 10% of the global budget). Shared savings and losses directly depend on
the quality score as well; as quality improves (declines), the share of providers’ deficit decreases (increases)
while the share of providers’ surplus increases (decreases). The base payment and the variable payment are
thus highly integrated (Mechanic & Altman, 2009; Chernew et al., 2011; Song et al., 2012; Song, 2014).
Gesundes Kinzigtal
Gesundes Kinzigtal is a population-based integrated care approach in the Kinzigtal region, Germany.
Providers are (financially) accountable for care across all health service sectors and indications (e.g. active
health promotion for the elderly, disease management programs for chronic conditions and patient
university programs). The target population consists of all individuals who are insured by one of the two
sickness funds in the region. Key to this initiative is the shared health gain approach by means of a shared
savings contract (i.e. financial goals are realised if actual costs in the region increase at a lower rate than the
German norm costs). The base payment is a global budget and equals the costs of the German risk-adjusted
standard (i.e. the norm costs within the context of the risk-equalisation system). Quality is stimulated by
means of a P4P-program (Hildebrandt et al., 2010; Hildebrandt et al., 2012; Busse & Stahl, 2014).
Henceforth, we focus on the first component of a theoretically preferred VBP – the base payment –
for two reasons. First, the design of the second component – the variable payment – has already
been extensively discussed in the literature (for an overview, see Eijkenaar, 2013; Milstein &
Schreyögg, 2016). Second, as argued above, the base payment typically comprises the majority of
providers’ revenues, underlining the importance of carefully designing the implicit incentives
generated by this component.
4.2 Five key features of a theoretically preferred base payment
Below, we explain which key features of a theoretically preferred base payment are required to
stimulate value in a broad sense. Based on a synthesis of the findings of key studies conducted in
6 Daniëlle Cattel et al.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744133118000397
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Erasmus MC Rotterdam, on 07 Nov 2018 at 14:16:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
the field of health services research, health economics, contract theory and the general economic
theory on incentive design, we conclude that the base payment should preferably be paid (1) to a
multidisciplinary provider group for delivering (2) a cohesive set of care activities to a predefined
population. In addition, the base payment should (3) be fixed, (4) be adjusted for the popula-
tion’s risk profile and (5) include risk-mitigating measures. We acknowledge that these five key
features are interrelated (e.g. for the provision of a comprehensive set of care activities a mul-
tidisciplinary provider group is required).
4.2.1 Multidisciplinary provider group
To encourage well-coordinated care, the base payment should jointly remunerate multi-
disciplinary groups of providers who have agreed to work together as an ‘accountable group’ for
the delivery of a cohesive set of care activities. Depending on the exact nature of the care
activities, these groups may consist of different types of physicians (e.g. primary care physicians
or medical specialists), other health care professionals (e.g. nurses or physiotherapists) and
various care facilities (e.g. specialty hospitals or rehabilitation centres).
Financial barriers between separately paid providers are removed once a single, integrated
payment for a provider group is introduced. Such an integrated payment to a provider team is
expected to encourage multidisciplinary cooperation and collaboration, fostering greater (cross-
specialty) coordination and increasing active provider engagement in improvements across the
whole care path (Anderson & Weller, 1999; Berenson, 2010; Burwell, 2015; Mehrotra & Hussey,
2015). This is of relevance particularly for the increasing number of individuals with multiple co-
existing (chronic) health problems who will likely benefit from well-coordinated, integrated care
(DeGruy & Etz, 2010; Pollack et al., 2012; Leijten et al., 2017). In addition, paying a provider
group instead of individual providers is likely to result in more flexibility in the use of resources
(Mechanic & Altman, 2009; Miller, 2009; Cutler & Ghosh, 2012; Tsiachristas et al., 2013).
Another advantage is that the financial risk that is associated with VBP is pooled. This may
prevent individual providers from being confronted with excessive financial risk and may reduce
incentives for undesired behaviour (Anderson & Weller, 1999; Gaynor et al., 2004; Vermaas,
2006; Frakt & Mayes, 2012).
Group-based incentives require a certain entity that contracts with the purchaser and receives
the payment on behalf of the provider group. This ‘main contracting entity’ administers the
payment and is responsible for the organisation, coordination and (possibly) the delivery of care
activities and employs or subcontracts other providers (Anderson & Weller, 1999). The main
contractor thus initially bears the financial risk and has to divide the pain and gain among the
group members. Entities such as ACOs, health maintenance organisations (HMOs) and hospitals
might qualify for this role because of their size and level of professionalism. To pass the
incentives along from the group to the individual providers, a transparent payment distribution
mechanism needs to be developed; it has to be decided ‘who is getting paid, how much, for doing
what’ (Frølich et al., 2007). For instance, distribution can be in proportion to the provider’s share
of the target population or the provider’s contribution to the group’s performance (Olson, 1965;
Gaynor et al., 2004; Conrad, 2015).
4.2.2 Cohesive set of care activities for a predefined population
To encourage cost-effective prevention, the base payment should remunerate a provider group
for the provision of a cohesive set of (preventive) care activities to a predefined population of
individuals. From a theoretical perspective, VBP ideally involves ‘whole-person accountability’.
Key to such an approach is that the payment is not disease-specific but person-centred and
holistic. The payment covers all relevant health services given a person’s needs. An evident set of
care activities that is covered by the payment is (virtually) the full continuum of services included
in the relevant benefit package in place. For instance, if a provider group accepts whole-person
accountability for a target population of diabetics, the provider group is not only responsible for
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all diabetes-related care but for all care services that the diabetics in the target population might
need, within limitations of the relevant benefit package covered by the health plan or other third
party payer. The target population may consist of any defined set of individuals, including those
not currently in need of care (Kindig, 2007).
Whole-person accountability triggers incentives for health promotion and prevention because
prevention is often more effective and cheaper than cure. The more a provider group improves
the health of the population, the greater the financial gain (Sharfstein, 2016). Stimulating pre-
ventive efforts is of great importance, since the causes of many health problems lie in individual
behaviour (e.g. smoking and unhealthy diet) and the current system does not effectively promote
healthy behaviour (Berwick et al., 2008; Casalino et al., 2015). Another advantage of a whole-
person accountability approach is that effective long-term management of chronic diseases (e.g.
delaying the progression of diseases and preventing exacerbations) is stimulated (Berenson, 2010;
McClellan et al., 2013; Conrad, 2015). In addition, cost-shifting becomes more difficult once the
payment applies to a broad set of care activities and is even impossible if the payment applies to
all care services (Sood, 2011; Busse & Stahl, 2014). The provision of unnecessary services is
expected to gradually be phased out (Gaynor et al., 2004; McClellan et al., 2013). Finally, the risk
of double payment for the same services decreases. Double payment is plausible in particular for
patients with comorbidity and if services are paid for through different systems (Hussey et al.,
2011; EIB, 2012; Ridgely et al., 2014).
Four characteristics can be used to delineate the target population: (1) individual character-
istics (e.g. age or diagnoses), (2) geographical catchment areas (e.g. region or ZIP-codes), (3)
provider affiliation (e.g. enrolment in a GP practice or retrospective assignment to a provider
based on actual utilisation) and (4) purchaser affiliation (e.g. having an insurance policy with a
specific insurer). The characteristics are not mutually exclusive. Under the AQC (Box 1), the
target population consists of individuals who are below 65 years of age, live in Massachusetts, are
registered with a primary health care provider, and have an HMO or preferred provider orga-
nisation (PPO) insurance policy from BCBS (Mechanic & Altman, 2009; Chernew et al., 2011;
Song et al., 2012; Song, 2014). Assignment of the target population to the provider group for the
coming year can be done prospectively (e.g. based on enrolment with affiliated primary care
physicians, or on health care utilisation in the prior year) or retrospectively (e.g. based on the
plurality of utilisation in the completed year). In case of prospective assignment, provider groups
know beforehand for whom they are responsible in the coming year, enabling providers to
proactively reach out to and improve care for their target population (Lewis et al., 2013). A
potential advantage of retrospective assignment is that it stimulates providers to manage costs
and quality for all of their patients, instead of just the assigned population. However, professional
ethics may effectively prevent that – under prospective assignment – providers will actually
distinguish between assigned and unassigned patients in terms of (the quality of) provided
services. Under the AQC, assignment is done prospectively, while under the MSSP a retro-
spective form is used (Box 1).
4.2.3 Fixed payment for a defined period of time
To encourage cost-conscious behaviour and cost-effective innovation, the base payment should
be fixed for a defined period of time, implying that there is no link with actual costs (Anderson &
Weller, 1999; Jegers et al., 2002). Such a method implies that (some of) the financial risk is
transferred from the purchaser to the provider. The financial result is retrospectively determined
by the difference between actual expenses and the prospectively defined, fixed payment
(‘reconciliation’).
A fixed payment for a defined period of time is theoretically preferred over a variable payment
because of the high potential for cost-conscious behaviour and cost-effective innovation. Because
marginal benefits are zero, providers are stimulated to reduce costs and to reconsider the full care
process (Jegers et al., 2002; Miller, 2009; Cutler & Gosh, 2012; Conrad et al., 2014; Conrad, 2015).
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Critically assessing care processes might also uncover room for substitution of relatively
expensive for relatively inexpensive services or providers (Casalino, 2001). In addition, because
the payment can be flexibly deployed, more attention can be paid to cost-effective, creative
management of care (Anderson & Weller, 1999; McConnell et al., 2014). Note, however, that a
fixed payment for a defined period of time also is a main feature of traditional capitation that was
heavily criticised in the past for, amongst other things, triggering care rationing and threatening
patient choice (Porter & Kaplan, 2016). These drawbacks from traditional capitation can be
addressed by adding a variable payment component guaranteeing high-quality care (see Section
4.1), by adopting adequate risk adjustment (see Section 4.2.4.) and by including arrangements to
mitigate excessive financial risk (see Section 4.2.5).
Below, three design issues of a fixed payment for a defined period of time are discussed:
setting the payment level, multiyear contracts and risk transfer.
4.2.3.1 Setting the payment level In general, three methods for setting the fixed payment level
can be discerned. A first method is based on historical expenses (Douven et al., 2015; Rose et al.,
2016). An advantage of this approach is that calculation is relatively straightforward. However,
because the payment level is based on prior expenses, past inefficiencies are ‘buried’ in the
payment (Newhouse et al., 1997; Berenson, 2010). Moreover, providers have a perverse incentive
to increase expenses in the years prior to the onset of the contract, in order to build up the
historical expenses that lie at the basis of the payment level (Berenson, 2010; Chernew et al.,
2011; Douven et al., 2015). A second approach is basing the payment on average expenses, for
instance per relevant peer group or region (Newhouse et al., 1997; Ellis & McGuire, 1988). An
advantage is that the payment is relatively easy to calculate and providers with higher than
average expenses due to inefficiency are stimulated to reassess their delivery processes. However,
providers with higher than average expenses as a result of a disproportionate amount of high-risk
individuals in the target population are disadvantaged (Rose et al., 2016). In this case, the
payment level can be considered as unfair and inaccurate, calling for appropriate risk adjustment
(Section 4.2.4). A third option is to base the payment on acceptable expenses (Newhouse et al.,
1997). In this case, the payment is set at a level that is sufficient to cover only those expenses
generated in delivering medically necessary, cost-effective care (Van de Ven & Ellis, 2000).
Although this approach seems theoretically preferred, it is difficult to implement in practice,
since selecting the ‘right’ care activities and putting a price upon each service is disputable or
likely to be unfeasible. Regardless of the chosen method for setting the payment level, the
absolute price is clearly of relevance too. The payment should at least be sufficient to cover
(potential) resource costs and to make the provision of high-value care worthwhile for providers.
4.2.3.2 Multiyear contracts Contracts in which the fixed payment level is specified can be
expected to be incomplete on a range of variables due to the multitasking problem (Maskin &
Tirole, 1999; Hart, 2003). In the case of incomplete contracts, a certain level of mutual trust
between the purchaser and the provider group is vital. Multiyear contracts are a sign of mutual
trust and prevent costly effort on ‘overwriting’ complex, short-term contracts (Marques & Berg,
2011). Microeconomic theory suggests that long-term contracts produce more favourable effects
as compared to short-term contracts. A multiyear contract is likely to stimulate innovation and
prevention because, over the longer term, providers are more likely to reap the financial benefits
of their investments (Silberberg, 1990; Christianson & Conrad, 2011; Shortell, 2013). On the
other hand, providers and purchasers may also be hesitant to conclude multiyear payment
contracts because of the concern about being locked into the contract. This calls for a certain
level of flexibility in the contract to be able to adjust for inflation and unforeseen events
(Chernew et al., 2011; Rose et al., 2016). In practice, multiyear VBP contracts have evolved, such
as the five-year AQC contracts (Box 1).
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4.2.3.3 Risk transfer An important consequence of a fixed base payment for a defined period of
time is that (some of) the financial risk is transferred from the purchaser to the accountable
provider group. Two types of risk may be transferred: insurance risk and performance risk.
Insurance risk is the risk that is typically borne by the purchaser and concerns the random
variation around the mean health care expenses. Performance risk is the systematic variation
around the mean expected health care expenses due to providers acting as imperfect agents. This
risk can be influenced by providers, as it directly relates to the clinical skills and the choices made
by the provider (Vermaas, 2006; De Brantes & Rastogi, 2008; Miller, 2009; Berenson, 2010).
Ideally, only performance risk is transferred to the provider group, whereas insurance risk
remains with the purchaser (Porter & Kaplan, 2016). After all, it is the typical function of a
purchaser to deal with random variation by pooling risks, and transforming providers into
insurers is not the goal of VBP. Because the target population of a provider group is likely to be
smaller than the total number of individuals the purchaser is responsible for, the conditions of
the law of the large numbers for effective risk pooling might not be sufficiently fulfilled.
Therefore, the provider group might face substantial financial risk due to large random variation
from the statistically expected result (Christianson & Conrad, 2011; Van de Ven, 2014). In
comparison to purchasers, providers have limited financial means at their disposal to compensate
for this random variation. Transferring insurance risk to providers could encourage risk selection
(Section 4.2.4) and, in extremis, providers might go bankrupt (Anderson & Weller, 1999; Ver-
maas, 2006).
Unfortunately, it is practically unfeasible to split insurance risk and performance risk (Ver-
maas, 2006). Often, unravelling the extent to which health outcomes are the result of chance or of
providers acting as (im)perfect agents is virtually impossible. For instance, a lower incidence of
diabetes-related health problems in the target population could be the result of a decrease of the
number of individuals with obesity due to a successful government campaign to improve lifestyle,
but could also stem from a provider’s successful effort in monitoring blood glucose levels. The
first explanation is not necessarily linked to the provider’s performance, while the second cause
refers to the provider acting as a good agent. While risk-splitting is thus not possible, distributing
the financial risk among providers and the purchaser in such a way that providers bear some, but
not all, of the risk may be a viable option (Frakt & Mayes, 2012).
4.2.4 Risk adjustment
To prevent undesired behaviour that may thwart key-value dimensions, the base payment should
be risk-adjusted. If the payment is not corrected for systematic variation in expenses due to
differences in risk characteristics of the target population, incentives for risk selection evolve
because then the financial result is partly determined by the risk composition of the population,
rather than a mark of achievement. Providers would be unfairly penalised financially if they are
responsible for a disproportionate amount of high-risk individuals rather than low-risk indivi-
duals. In this case, providers have a financial incentive for risk selection which is the practice of
attracting low-risk individuals for which the payment exceeds expected expenses and/or avoiding
high-risk individuals for which the opposite holds (Iezzoni, 2003; Sood, 2011; Rose et al., 2016).
Risk selection is undesired because it may jeopardise quality, equal access and efficiency (Welch,
1999; Jegers et al., 2002; Barros, 2003). Several empirical studies provide evidence of risk selection
by capitated provider groups (Newhouse & Byrne, 1988; Frank & Lave, 1989; Newhouse, 1989;
Cutler & Zeckhauser, 1998; Altman et al., 2000; Dranove et al., 2003; Chang et al., 2012; Hsieh
et al., 2016).
In case of fixed payments, provider groups may experience incentives for risk selection.
Because of the relatively small size of target populations a small number of high-risk individuals
may have a large impact on the global budget. Providers are in the position to be successful in
risk selection. First, providers are particularly well equipped to effectively identify low-risk and
high-risk individuals because they have information about the health status of their target
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population and they are professionally trained to assess this type of information. Second, pro-
viders have subtle tools for risk selection. For instance, a provider might advise a high-risk
patient to switch to a different provider by suggesting that he or she would be better served
elsewhere (Folland et al., 2013). Non-financial restraints, such as peer review and professional
ethics, may however counteract incentives for providers to engage in risk selection (Eggleston,
2000).
With risk adjustment predictable, systematic variation in expenses as a result of differences in
risk characteristics of the population is recognised and accounted for. In this way, risk adjust-
ment contributes to a fair allocation of payments and ensures that providers are willing to accept
and serve high-risk individuals. Ideally, risk adjustment creates a level playing field for providers
(Anderson & Weller, 1999; Iezzoni, 2003; McGuire, 2011; Ash & Ellis, 2012; Omachi et al., 2013;
Brilleman et al., 2014; Rose et al., 2016). In Gesundes Kinzigtal, the base payment equals the
normative cost-level calculated using the German risk-adjustment model for health insurers, and
ACO and AQC models use population risk-score software to adjust for differences in risk
characteristics of the target population (Box 1). It is an interesting question to what extent
existing risk-adjustment models – most of which were originally developed to adjust capitation
payments for insurers – can be (adequately) used to adjust provider payments, taking account of
differences between provider and insurer payment regarding incentives and tools for risk
selection.
4.2.5 Arrangements to limit excessive financial risk
To prevent undesired behaviour that may thwart key-value dimensions, the base payment
should include arrangements that effectively mitigate excessive financial risk for providers. As
discussed before, providers accepting VBP share financial risk with the purchaser. Risk
adjustment accounts for systematic, predictable variation in expenses. However, the majority
of between-person variance is random and unpredictable (Van Vliet, 1992; Newhouse, 1996;
Ellis & McGuire, 2007). This implies that, even in the unlikely case of perfect risk adjustment,
providers still face significant residual financial risk. To protect providers against excessive
financial risk, additional approaches to mitigate this risk are likely to be required. In prin-
ciple, these arrangements are focussed on protecting providers against large, unpredictable,
random losses (i.e. insurance risk). However, such arrangements could also include protection
against predictable and systematic risk that is, for whatever reason, not corrected for by a
risk-adjustment model. Note that risk-mitigating arrangements could be used not only to
limit but also to (gradually) expand the financial risk a provider runs. Below, we elaborate on
two main parameters that can be simultaneously used to bring the financial risk to appro-
priate levels.
4.2.5.1 Type of risk sharing Two main types of risk contracts can be distinguished. Under a
one-sided risk contract, providers that keep expenses below the global payment share in the
savings with the purchaser. An advantage is that providers can get familiar to accepting
financial ‘risk’ without sharing in the losses and, keeping all else constant, have less incentives
for undesired behaviour such as risk selection (Berwick, 2011). Under a two-sided risk contract,
providers share in the savings, but also in the losses if expenses exceed the global budget.
Providers accepting two-sided risk qualify for higher shared savings rates (Berwick, 2011; Rose
et al., 2016). Theoretical and empirical evidence from the field of behavioural economics has
shown that individuals tend to prefer avoiding losses to achieving equivalent gains (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979; McNeil et al., 1982), suggesting that a two-sided risk contract provides
stronger incentives for value than a contract that includes rewards only (Berenson, 2010).
However, incentives for undesired behaviour increase under a two-sided risk contract
(assuming imperfect risk adjustment). In the MSSP, ACOs can opt for a one-sided or a two-
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sided risk contract while they are in their first two contract periods. After this period, they can
only accept a two-sided risk contract (Berwick, 2011; Rose et al., 2016).
In addition to one- and two-sided risk contracts, risk corridors and reinsurance can be used
to bring financial risk to the appropriate level. Risk corridors protect against cumulative losses,
because losses and gains are limited beyond a predefined acceptable range (Layton et al., 2016).
Reinsurance can be defined as ‘the insurance of contractual liabilities incurred under contracts
of direct insurance or reinsurance’ (Carter, 1983: 4). In the case of VBP, reinsurance would
imply that providers are retrospectively reimbursed by the purchaser for some or all of the
expenses of specific individuals from their population, based on prospectively determined
conditions. Under the AQC, for example providers can buy reinsurance from BCBS or an
external entity (Chernew et al., 2011). A variety of non-mutually exclusive reinsurance tech-
niques exist, such as stop-loss contracts, proportional risk sharing and outlier risk sharing (e.g.
Carter, 1983; Von Eije, 1989; Bovbjerg, 1992; Van Barneveld et al., 1998; Anderson & Weller,
1999; Vermaas, 2006; Miller, 2009).
4.2.5.2 Extent of risk sharing Under VBP, the main contractor (i.e. provider group) shares the
financial risk with the purchaser. Thus, the provider group is typically liable for less than 100% of
the financial result (Vermaas, 2006; Frakt & Mayes, 2012). The risk rate (i.e. the share of savings/
losses the provider group is accountable for) should not be set too high in order to keep the risk
manageable for the provider group and to prevent (strong) incentives for risk selection in the
case of imperfect risk adjustment. However, this rate should not be set too low either, because
then the incentives lack power to actually affect provider’s behaviour (Laffont & Tirole, 1993;
Gaynor et al., 2004).
The risk rate ideally depends on several variables. A first factor concerns the size of the target
population. Ceteris paribus, if the size of the population increases, the payment is expected to
gain in stability due to the law of the large numbers, allowing higher risk rates. Second, it seems
natural to increase the risk rate for primary relative to secondary care if a primary care group acts
as main contractor, while the opposite may be preferred if a hospital accepts this role. Third, the
diminishing marginal utility of income might be taken into account (Conrad & Perry, 2009).
Under the AQC, the risk borne by the different groups of providers ranges from 50% to 100%
and is periodically (re)negotiated between the provider group and BCBS (Chernew et al., 2011).
In addition to the risk rate, carve-outs can be used to influence the extent of risk sharing.
Carve-outs mitigate the financial risk for providers by placing a portion of the risk outside the
payment and contracting separately for this risk (Frank & McGuire, 1998). For VBP, this would
imply that certain services, medical conditions or populations are excluded from the contract and
are paid for on a separate basis, such as FFS. Consequently, providers are protected against the
associated high expenses of these services, conditions or populations and the high costs that are
associated with acquiring the needed expertise (Frank & McGuire, 1998). Examples of possible
carve-outs are intensive care, organ transplantation, mental health or cancer care. Carve-outs
may also be required if whole-person accountability is not (instantly) feasible from a practical
point of view or for those care services for which risk adjustment is not or insufficiently
attainable; carve-outs can be used as an interim measure to (temporarily) exclude certain care
types from the payment.
5. Trade-offs in the operationalisation of the base payment
In Section 4, a theoretically preferred VBP design was discussed. We explained how the largest
component of VBP – the base payment – should preferably be designed to incentivise value.
When it comes to the practical operationalisation of the base payment, several inherent trade-offs
arise, implying that no ‘one size fits all’ design exists that can optimally incentivise all key-value
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dimensions simultaneously. The practical operationalisation of the base payment and the extent
to which the different value dimensions are incentivised, depend on three determinants: (1)
compatibility of incentives, (2) preferences and (3) context. Below, these determinants are briefly
discussed and illustrated.
5.1 Compatibility of incentives
Theory predicts that several key features of the base payment are likely to conflict to a certain
extent. For instance, regarding the optimal composition and size of the provider group, stronger
incentives for well-coordinated care must be traded-off against weaker incentives for cost-
conscious behaviour. In order to be able to deliver (virtually) the full continuum of care and
realise well-coordinated care, the provider group will have to be composed of many different
types of providers. But, as the composition becomes more diverse, the size of the provider group
is likely to increase as well. Consequently, the financial risk that is associated with VBP is
necessarily spread over more providers within the group, reducing the financial incentives for
individual providers and increasing incentives for free-rider behaviour (Gaynor & Gertler, 1995;
Gaynor et al., 2004; Town et al., 2004; Conrad, 2015).
Another example of a practical decision involving trade-offs is about the comprehensiveness
of the set of activities a provider group is responsible for. If the payment covers a broader set of
care activities, the payment moves towards ‘whole-person accountability’ and incentives for
health promotion and (primary) prevention become stronger. However, given that perfect risk
adjustment is practically unfeasible, a more comprehensive set of activities will also increase the
incentives for risk selection. Hence, stronger incentives for cost-effective prevention should be
weighed against stronger incentives for risk selection.
5.2 Preferences
In trading-off the different value dimensions, decision-makers should carefully weigh preferences
for each dimension, taking full account of relevant (societal) interests. For instance, if in a
country health care expenses are considered to be at an acceptable level, while quality is con-
sidered to be suboptimal, decision-makers may attach greater importance to incentives for high-
quality care and compromise on the incentives for cost-conscious behaviour (under the
assumption that higher quality is associated with higher expenses). In this case, the share of the
variable payment may be expanded, whereas the financial risk for providers may be reduced.
Alternatively, a country with escalating health care expenses and an inefficient health care system
may choose to intensify incentives for cost-conscious behaviour by expanding the financial risk
for providers, while accepting the possible negative consequences in terms of stronger incentives
for risk selection.
5.3 Context
The context of implementation can have a major impact on the practical operationalisation of
the base payment, implying that VBP should be structured in relation to the circumstances of
time and place (Conrad et al., 2016). The following four examples illustrate this. First, if limited
individual-level data on population risk characteristics are routinely available, a base payment
that requires sophisticated risk adjustment is unlikely to be practically feasible. Second, in a
setting where providers still predominantly work in monodisciplinary ‘silos’, it might be pro-
blematic to find provider groups that are willing and able to accept whole-person accountability.
Third, in a setting in which the IT-infrastructure is underdeveloped, it is unlikely that a mul-
tidisciplinary provider group is effectively able to share the information required to realise well-
orchestrated, integrated care for the target population (Miller, 2009; Berwick, 2011). Fourth,
expanding the size and scope of providers groups covered by VBP may also affect market
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concentration and therefore may reduce consumer choice and workable competition.
Therefore, in countries with a competitive health care system, the optimal size and scope of
provider groups covered by VBP may be smaller than in countries with a more centralised health
care system.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has provided a conceptual framework of key components and design features of a
theoretically preferred VBP method. We consider a provider payment method ‘value-based’ if it
stimulates value in a broad sense, that is if it offers incentives for: (1) high-quality care, (2) cost-
conscious behaviour, (3) well-coordinated care, (4) cost-effective innovation and (5) cost-
effective prevention.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper in the provider payment literature with a prime focus
on the design of such a VBP method, and in particular of arguably the most important com-
ponent thereof: the base payment. Based on a synthesis of existing literature from a variety of
fields, this paper provides insight in the contours of a theoretically preferred VBP method.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. Inspired by the societal debate on what
stakeholders in health care should ideally strive for, as well as by existing definitions of value, we
first described and further specified the concept of value, facilitating the specification of
requirements in the design of VBP. We conclude that, in this respect, value is ideally con-
ceptualised as a multifaceted concept, comprising not only high quality of care at the lowest
possible costs but also efficient cooperation, innovation and health promotion. Second, starting
from these value dimensions, we derived various design features of a theoretically preferred VBP
model. We conclude that in order to stimulate value in a broad sense, the payment should consist
of two main components that must be carefully designed. The first component is a risk-adjusted
global base payment with risk-sharing elements paid to a multidisciplinary provider group for
the provision of (virtually) the full continuum of care to a certain population. The second
component is a relatively low-powered variable payment that explicitly rewards aspects of value
that can be adequately measured.
Although a well-designed VBP is clearly a necessary condition for realising value-based health
care, we acknowledge that it is unlikely to be a sufficient condition. Non-financial mechanisms as
well as organisational structures may be at least as important (Robinson, 2001; Christianson &
Conrad, 2011; Phipps-Taylor & Shortell, 2016). Furthermore, as explained above, the practical
operationalisation and implementation of a well-designed VBP model should not be under-
estimated and be well tailored to the specific context. Nevertheless, several innovative payment
initiatives in practice already come quite close to the theoretically preferred VBP-design
described in this paper, indicating that this design can actually be implemented in various
contexts. An interesting direction for future research would be gaining more insight in how a
two-component model as described in this paper can be practically operationalised and suc-
cessfully implemented given the relevant context, as well as in the short- and long-term effects of
introducing such a model on different value dimensions.
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